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MISSOURI SECTION
NOTES
THE PRODUCTION AND INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS,
PAPERS, AND TANGIBLE THINGS IN MISSOURI:
A COMPARISON TO THE FEDERAL RULES
Of the six methods of pre-trial discovery used in Missouri and in
the federal courts,, this note will consider one: the production in civil
actions of documents, papers, and tangible things, and the inspection
of real and other property. Discovery in criminal actions will not be
considered. The scope of the discussion is designed to emphasize
Missouri law, with federal law being considered only for comparison.
The purpose of this note is to set forth and analyze the law pertaining
to this one phase of discovery, and to evaluate the results which the
courts have reached.
Discovery procedure developed because pleading technique failed to
narrow the issues and provide the notice necessary for adequate prep-
aration of a case.2 Ragland, in his landmark book, Discovery Before
Trial, explains how two practices-fictitious allegations and extensive
use of the general issue-destroyed the efficiency of both common law
and code pleading, and how discovery techniques were developed in
order to ameliorate this condition3 The evolution of discovery pro-
cedure has been, in large measure, a search for the answer to the
question: How much is a party entitled to learn from his opponent
before trial? The ever-broadening scope of discovery indicates that
the question has not yet been fully answered.
At common law discovery of any kind was, as a general rule, prohib-
ited.' In equity, a bill of discovery could be obtained for the inspection
of property, although it was more commonly used for obtaining testi-
monial evidence. Such a bill might be granted by the chancellor in
aid of actions at law as well as in equity cases.' The equity bill of
discovery, however, permitted only partial discovery, as it could be
1. The five methods not considered are: depositions, interrogatories to theparties, orders for physical or mental examination, pre-trial conferences, and re-
quests for admission of the genuineness of documents.
2. 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1845 (3d ed. 1940) (hereinafter cited as WIGMORE);
RAGLAND, DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 1-8 (1932); Sunderland, Scope and Method of
Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863 (1933).
3. RAGLAND, op. cit. supra note 2, at 2-11. See also Green, Preparation for
Trial, 1955 WASH. U.L.Q. 154, 163.
4. 6 WIGMORE § 1845; SUNDERLAND, supra note 2, at 865. Although there werefive limited situations in which a party might inspect an adversary's documents
before trial, Wigmore considers only two of them to be true exceptions to the
general rule proscribing discovery. 6 WGMORE § 1858.
5. 6 WIGMORE § 1857; 23 IND. L.J. 333, 334 (1948).
6. Ibid.
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used only to seek evidence in support of a party's own case.' Discovery
in the modern sense, on the other hand, allows a party to seek evidence
in support of a claim or defense of the adversary, as well as evidence
in support of his own claim or defense.
The earliest discovery statutes did nothing more than permit com-
mon-law courts to employ the procedures used in equity. During the
mid-nineteenth century, however, the legislatures of many states,
inspired by the same liberal spirit which gave birth to code pleading,
passed statutes providing for unrestricted discovery procedure., Such
legislation was motivated by the conviction that existing discovery
procedures were too narrow in scope and that justice required wider
usage of pre-trial discovery. 0 In some states, however, the legislative
intent was thwarted by judicial interpretation of discovery statutes as
a summary, rather than as an expansion, of the status ante."1
Missouri was one of the earliest states to reform its discovery
technique. In 1849 the Missouri legislature adopted statutory pro-
visions allowing broad pre-trial production of papers and documents.
These provisions remained substantially unchanged until the present
Code of Civil Procedure went into effect on January 1, 1945.12 The
early, pre-1945 statutory provisions for discovery were construed by
the Missouri courts not merely as a replacement of the bill of dis-
covery and its statutory counterpart; they were interpreted as allow-
ing a party to inspect matter material to any of the issues in the
pending action, and not as limiting discovery to matter in support of
the seeking party's own case."3
The present Missouri Code of Civil Procedure contains two pro-
visions for pre-trial production and inspection: Sections 86 and 142.
Section 86, which permits the pre-trial inspection of res under the
control of parties, can be traced to the original Missouri statutes pro-
viding for production and inspection. 4 Section 142, on the other hand,
7. 6 WIGMORE 5 1846.
8. 6 WIGMORE § 1856a. See, e.g.. Mo. Laws 1822, c. 363, § 44.
9. RAGLAND, DiscovERY BEFoRE TRIAL 17 (1932).
10. 6 WIGMORE § 1859.
11. 6 WIGMORE § 1859c; Cf. RAGLAND, op. cit. supra note 9. at 144.
12. Mo. Practice in Courts of Justice Act art. XXIV (1849). Mo. Laws 1849,
at 97. Compare the wording of Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 1075, 1076, 1079 (1939), uith
that of Mo. REv. STAT. C. 128, art. X, . 36, 37, 40 (1855).
13. Cf. State ex rel. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Trimble, 254 Mo. 542, 163 S.W.
860 (1914).
14. See note 12 supra. Section 86 (Mo. REv. STAT. § 510.030 (1949)) provides:
U-non motion of any party showing good cause therefor and unon notice to
all other parties, the court in which an action is pending may (1) order any
party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing,
by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers,
books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or tangible things, not privi-
leged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved
in the action and which are in his possession, custody, or control; or (2)
order any party to permit entry upon designated land or other property in
his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1955/iss4/8
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permits the pre-trial inspection of documents under the control of
witnesses, and apparently has no ancestor in the earlier Missouri
statutes. 5 The 1945 Missouri Code of Civil Procedure, however, ad-
mittedly was inspired by the liberal provisions of the 1938 Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure; and indeed, Section 86 of the Missouri code
contains the same wording as the original Federal Rule 34.16 Despite
this inspiration, this writer contends that the scope of discovery by
means of production and inspection has broadened only slightly under
the present Missouri code, and the influence of the old Missouri
statutes on discovery has been paramount.
In appearance, at least, the new code brought about two changes
which broadened the scope of production and inspection. One was the
addition of several new types of things which a party could be allowed
to inspect. The early statutes referred only to "books, pap3rs, and
documents," whereas Section 86 of the present code permits inspection
of "documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects,
or tangible things," as well as entry upon "land or other property."
The importance of the new wording can be minimized, however, be-
cause the Missouri Supreme Court had already permitted the inspec-
tion of tangible things under the old statute by virtue of the courts'
inherent power to see that justice is done.1 7 Likewise, it seems that
the same power could have been used to permit entry upon real prop-
erty.
The second change accomplished by the adoption of the new code
was the addition of Section 142, as mentioned above. This section
makes available the production and inspection of documents at the
taking of a deposition by means of a subpoena duces tecum. By this
method, discovery of documents may be obtained from anyone who
can be compelled to give a deposition; Section 86, as well as the old
law, permits discovery only from parties to the case.'
Because of the inspiration derived from the Federal Rules, and
because of the similarity of wording of the respective statutory pro-
visions, it would seem that production and inspection under the Mis-
souri Code of Civil Procedure ought to be as widely allowed as is pro-
duction and inspection under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
sampling. or photographing the property or any designated relevant object
or operation thereon. The order shall specify the time, place, and manner
of making the inspection and taking the copies and photographs and may
prescribe such terms -nd conditions -s nre just.
15. Section 142 (Mo. REv. STAT. § 492.280 (1949)) provides:
Upon order of the court in which a cause is pending a subpoena may com-
mand the production of documentary evidence on the taking of a deposition
and the court may also order a party to produce documentary evidence on
the taking of a deposition.
16. Federal Rule 34 was amended in 1946. See text supported by note 21 infra.
17. State ex rel. American Mfg. Co. v. Anderson, 270 Mo. 533, 194 S.W. 268
(1917).
18. 1 CARR, MISSOURI CIVIL PRocEDuRE § 661 (1947).
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This, however, is not the case; the scope of production and inspection
allowed by the federal courts is considerably broader than that allowed
by the Missouri courts. The difference arises out of the diversity of
opinion over the judicial requirements which must be met before an
order for production and inspection will be given. The federal courts,
liberally interpreting the Federal Rules, have restricted the require-
ments and broadened the scope of discovery; the Missouri courts have
apparently continued to enforce those requirements established in re-
gard to the prior code, making little concession to the spirit in which
the new code was conceived. It is in this area that the distinction
between the Missouri code and the Federal Rules arises, and it is
here that the controversy between the protagonists and opponents of
liberal discovery procedures is centered.
Before considering these judicial requirements for production and
inspection under the Missouri code, it should be pointed out that Sec-
tions 86 and 142 have been construed in pan matenja.l The courts
have thus held that a party seeking discovery under Section 142 must
meet the same standard of materiality and relevancy that is required
under Section 86.20 Similarly, Section 85 of the code, which provides
for discovery by interrogatory, has been construed in pari materia
with Sections 86 and 142 ;21 hence, cases regarding that section will be
considered when they aid the analysis of the two sections under con-
sideration.
The requirements which must be met in the Missouri courts before
an order for production and inspection will be given are: (1) an action
'must be pending; (2) the matter sought must be admissible evidence;
(3) the matter sought must be non-privileged; (4) the matter sought
must be "designated"; (5) the matter sought must be in the posses-
sion, custody, or control of the person to whom the order is to be ad-
dressed; (6) there must be "good cause" for discovery.
I The first requisite to discovery by production and inspection is that
an action must be pending. 2 This means that a petition, based upon a
legitimate grievance between the parties, must have been filed.23 The
Supreme Court of Missouri has held that a party who has filed a peti-
tion need not wait for an answer before seeking production.24 That is,
a case is "pending" for discovery purposes before issue is joined.
19. State ex rel. Thompson v. Harris, 355 Mo. 176, 195 S.W.2d 645 (1946).
20. Ibid. The adoption of this canon of construction is not unusual in the in-
terpretation of discovery statutes. Holtzoff, Instruments of Discovery Under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 41 Micr. L. REv. 205, 222 (1942).
21. State ex rel. Thompson v. Harris, 355 Mo. 176, 195 S.W.2d 645 (1946).
22. This is a common requirement. See RAGLAND, DiscovERY BEFORE TRIAL 54
(1932).
23. In some jurisdictions this. requirement has been circumvented by the filing
-of "skeleton" pleadings. See RAGLAND, op. cit. supra note 22, at 60.
24. State ex rel. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Sartorius, 351 Mo. 111, 171
S.W.2d 569 (1943). See also State ex rel. Pieper v. Mueller, 227 Mo. App. 1101,
59 S.W.2d 719 (1933).
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The possibility of an order for production and inspection before
issue is joined creates at least a theoretical difficulty in the application
of the second requirement that the matter sought by discovery must
be admissible evidence. Without issue, a precise determination of ad-
missibility cannot be made. Although the problem has been encoun-
tered by the courts of other states,2 5 the Missouri courts apparently
have never been confronted with this dilemma.
The second requirement, that the matter sought be admissible
evidence, has been steadfastly followed by the Missouri courts under
both the new and old codes, despite the fact that neither statute ex-
plicitly calls for admissible evidence.26 Section 86 of the present code
does require "evidence material to any matter involved in the action."
It is generally agreed, however, that material evidence is not neces-
sarily admissible,27 and so it would seem that a literal construction of
the statute would not demand admissibility as a standard. This sug-
gestion is reinforced by the fact that the special mention in the statute
of the third requirement, that the matter sought be non-privileged,
would have been unnecessary if the legislature had intended "mate-
rial" to mean "admissible," because privileged matter is not adm'ssible.
Federal Rule 34, as mentioned previously, originally had the same
provision as Section 86 of the Missouri code, in that it required "evi-
dence material to any matter involved in the action. '28 Some federal
courts gave this provision the same narrow interpretation that the
Missouri courts follow, i.e., they read into the statute the requirement
that the evidence must be admissible.29 Other federal courts, however,
took a broader view and permitted discovery if the evidence was
relevant and gave promise of leading to admissible evidence.30 In 1946,
the latter view was adopted by an amendment to Rule 34, which now
requires "evidence relating to any of the matters within the scope of
the examination permitted by Rule 26 (b) "4--viz., "any matter . . .
which is relevant to the subject matter. . . . It is not ground for ob-
25. Horlick's Malted Milk Co. v. Spiegel Co., 155 Wis. 201, 144 N.W. 272(1913) (The entire complaint was considered to be in issue.); cf. Boston & M.
R.R. v. State, 75 N.H. 513, 77 Atl. 996 (1910) (An answer had actually been filed,
but the issues were not defined so that the court could determine admissibility.
The court said the test is whether there may be admissible evidence.).
26. Compare State ex rel. Evans v. Broaddus, 245 Mo. 123, 149 S.W. 473(1912), w ith State ex rel. Thompson v. Harris, 355 Mo. 176, 195 S.W.2d 645(1946).
27. WIGMORF, STUDENT'S TEXTBOOK OF EVIDENCE 36 (1935); see MCCORMICK,
EVIDENCE 315 (1954).
28. 4 MOOPE. FEDERAL PRACTICE 2422 (1950).
29. Galbreath v. Bond Stores, Inc., 8 F.R S. 34.11, case 1 (W.D. Mo. 1944);
Barwick v. Powell, 1 F.R.D. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Kenealy v. Texas Co., 29 F.
Supp. 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
30. Mackerer v. N.Y. Cent. RR., 1 F.R D. 408 (E.D.N.Y. 1940); Walling v.
Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 4 F.R.D. 265 (E.D.N.Y. 1943); See 2 BARRON &
HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 797 (1950).
31. See 5 F.R.D. 433 (1946) for the committee report on the amendment.
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jection that the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial if the testi-
mony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence."
-..Even before the adoption of the amendment, the Missouri Supreme
Court rejected the liberal federal view in State ex tel. Thompson v.
Harris.3 2 Nominally, the Court thus superimposed the whole frame-
work of the law of evidence upon the pre-trial stage of litigation. It
may be wondered how the rules designed for one purpose can serve
another. Nevertheless, the Missouri courts have prohibited the produc-
tion of documents because they contained hearsay statements ;3 have
compelled production under th6 business records exception to the
hearsay rule ;34 and have even hinted that they might permit discovery
of a statement which constitutes an admission against interest 25 Even
within the admissibility requirement itself the Missouri Supreme
Court has tended to restrict the scope of production and inspection by
refusing to permit discovery of matter admissible solely for the pur-
pose of impeaching a witness.'0
It is this requirement that the matter sought be admissible which
is the primary distinction between Missouri and federal discovery
practice, and the one which places Missouri out of that group of juris-
dictions permitting broad use of discovery techniques.
The requirement of admissibility is intertwined with the third re-
quirement that the matter sought be non-privileged. The non-privilege
requirement has been construed to encompass the traditional evi-
dentiary privileges recognized at trial.37 It might seem, therefore, that
a treatment of it apart from the admissibility concept is redundant.
The justification for considering it separately is its special mention
in the Missouri'statute which gives it an existence independent of the
court-imposed admissibility requirement.
The most common situations in which the statutory privilege has
been invoked involve communications between attorney and client.
Thus, privilege has been used in Missouri to prohibit production of
letters from an attorney to his client.38 A distinction must be made,
however, between the fact communicated and the document itself.
32. 355 Mo. 176, 195 S.W.2d 645 (1946).
33. State ex rel. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Hall, 325 Mo. 102, 27 S.W,2d 1027
(1930).
34. State ex rel. Iron Fireman Corp. v. Ward, 351 Mo. 761, 173 S.W.2d 920
(1943).
35. Id. at 767, 173 S.W.2d at 923.
-36: State ex rel. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Hall, 325 Mo. 102, 27 S.W.2d 1027
(1930).
37. State ex rel. Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Flynn, 363 Mo. 1065, 257 S.W.2d 69
(1953), 1954 WASH. U.L.Q. 100; State ex rel. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Wood,
316 Mo. 1032, 292 S.W. 1033 (1927).
38. State ex rel. Chicago R.I. & P.R.R. v. Wood, 316 Mo. 1032, 292 S.W. 1033
(1927).
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While the facts communicated to a lawyer in a written document are
privileged just as they would be if the client had disclosed them
orally, the document itself, unlike oral communications, will not be
privileged solely because it was transferred to counsel. Both the Mis-
souri and the federal courts hold that such documents or other matter
submitted to counsel are privileged from discovery only when prepared
for the use of counsel in pending or threatened litigation; and it will
not be privileged where the material was prepared in the client's
regular course of business. The privilege will be recognized, how-
ever, even though the material was actually prepared by the client's
agent.41'
The difficulties that may arise in determining what is preparation
for counsel, what is pending or threatened litigation, and, conversely,
what is the regular course of business, are illustrated by two Missouri
cases. In State ex rel. Iron Fireman Corp. v. Ward41 the court denied
privilege and ordered production of records showing the results of
inspections of a damaged boiler made within the month after it ex-
ploded. Because the defendant was in the business of installing and
repairing boilers, and had made several regular inspections prior to
the explosion, the court seemed willing to accept the idea that the in-
spections after the explosion were also made in the regular course of
business. From the facts of the case, however, it seems as likely that
the inspections were made to aid in anticipated litigation as it does
that they were merely in the course of business. On the other hand,
in State ex rel. Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Flynn,'42 the court denied, on
the basis of privilege, production of photographs of the scene of the
accident taken immediately after the accident occurred by an employee
of the defendant company, despite the fact that no litigation was pend-
ing and that the employee testified that he took the photographs be-
cause he thought it was his duty to do so. The borderland between
the Ward case and the Flynn case is a hazy one. Either case, it seems,
could have been decided the other way.
The most controversial area in which the privilege clause has been
invoked involves matter gathered by counsel from a third party, or
documents and papers prepared by counsel himself. This material,
popularly termed "work product," does not actually warrant immunity
from discovery under the evidentiary attorney-client privilege because
39. Missouri: State ex rel. Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Flynn, 363 Mo. 1065, 257
S.W.2d 69 (1953), 1954 WASH. U.L.Q. 100; State'ex rel. Iron Fireman Corp. v.Ward, 351 Mo. 761, 173 S.W.2d 920 (1943). Fedeial: Eiseman v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 3 F.R.D. 338 (E.D. Pa. 1944); Stark v. American Dredging Co., 3 F.R.D.
-300 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
40. Missouri: State ex rel. Iron Fireman Corp. v. Ward, 351 Mo. 761, 173 S.W.
2d 920 (1943). Federal: Byers Theaters, Inc. v. Murphy, 1 F.R.D. 286, 289(W.D. Va. 1940). The same rule applies at the time of trial. 8 WIGMoRE § 2317.
41. 351 Mo. 761, 173 S.W.2d 920 (1943).
42. 363 Mo. 1065, 257 S.W.2d 69 (1953), 1954 WASH. U.L.Q. 100.
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no communication between client and counsel is involved. The confu-
sion in the work product situation was vastly relieved in the federal
courts by the Supreme Court in the leading case of Hickman V.
Taylor,4 3 although the rule set forth in that case created new problems
of application. In that case, the work product was recognized by the
Court as being outside the usual evidentiary attorney-client privilege,
but production was not granted because it was believed that "privi-
lege," as it is used in the discovery statutes, should be interpreted to
include the material constituting a lawyer's preparation of a case,
unless good cause for production is shown.44
There are no reported Missouri cases concerning production and
inspection of the work product of counsel. The probable reason for
this is that the admissibility requirement, as it has been interpreted
by the Missouri courts, exempts so much from discovery that there is
no room for the development of a doctrine like that expressed in the
Hickman case. The Missouri Supreme Court has held, however, that
the privilege for work product recognized in the Hickman case should
also apply to the work product of the parties and their investigators.
Thus, in State ex rel. Miller's Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Caruthers,4
discovery of intracompany instructions to the defendant insurance
company's adjustor was denied.
The federal courts have limited the scope of the work product privi-
lege, with few exceptions,' to the work of counsel.4 7 In fact, while the
Hickman case was pending, the Supreme Court rejected a proposed
amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provided
for the exclusion of material prepared or obtained in anticipation of
litigation or in preparation for trial by the party, his surety, indem-
nitor, or agent, as well as the party's attorney.5
The immunity granted to matter submitted to counsel and to the
43. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
44. The good cause condition indicates that the privilege is not absolute. Good
cause must be shown in all cases under §§ 86 and 142 of the Missouri civil code
and under Federal Rule 34. See the discussion of this requirement at p. 424
infra. Except where the work product of counsel is involved, good cause need
not be shown for depositions or interrogatories in either jurisdiction, or for a
subpoena duces tecum under Federal Rule 45.
The Court in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), suggested that good
cause might exist: (1) whenever production of witness's statements was neces-
sary to forestall a failure of proof; or (2) whenever such statements might be
admissible as evidence or give clues to relevant evidence not otherwise available,
or be useful for impeachment or corroboration; or (3) whenever the witness who
gave the statement was no longer available.
45. 360 Mo. 8, 226 S.W.2d 711 (1950).
46. Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949); Snyder v. Atchi-
son, T. & S.F. Ry., 11 F.R.S. 33.351, case I (W.D. Mo. 1948); Hanke v. Milwaukee
Elec. Ry, 7 F.R.D. 540 (E.D. Wis. 1947).
47. De Bruce v. Pennsylvania R.R., 6 F.R.D. 403 (E.D. Pa. 1947); 2 BARRON
& HOLTZOFF, FEDRAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 792 (1950).
48. Advisory Comm. on Rules for Civil Procedure, Report of Proposed Ameand-
ments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 5 F.R.D. 436, 456-57 (1946).
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work product of counsel can be justified on well-accepted grounds of
policy. It is generally conceded that privileged matter is not admitted
at trial because the interests protected are deemed sufficiently impor-
tant to warrant the exclusion of reliable evidence.49 Communications
between husband and wife, attorney and client, and physician and
patient are privileged mainly to promote full disclosure and stronger
relations between these parties. The reasons for granting immunity
to communications between these parties apply just as forcefully at
the pre-trial stage as at the trial itself. Related to the need to protect
the attorney-client relationship is the need to protect counsel in the
privacy of his work. There have been arguments in favor of the work
product privilege based upon the fear of encouraging laziness among
counsel and the need to prevent the unjust enrichment which would
result from allowing discovery of the fruits of the adversary's labor.50
The Supreme Court reached its decision in the Hickman case, how-
ever, solely because:
Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is bound to
work for the advancement of justice while faithfully protecting
the rightful interests of his clients. . . Proper preparation of a
client's case demands that he [counsel] assemble information,
sift what he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts,
prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue
and needless interference. . . . Were such materials open to op-
posing counsel on mere demand, much of what is now put down
in writing would remain unwritten. An attorney's thoughts, here-
tofore inviolate, would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness
and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal
advice and in the preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the
legal profession would be demoralizing. And the interests of the
clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served. 51
The privilege granted by the Missouri courts to the work product
of the party, his agent, or indemnitor can only be justified, if at all, on
grounds which go to the very foundation of the discovery process:
How much is a party entitled to know of his opponent's case? The
issue is a question of fairness to the parties-notice to the adversary
versus privacy in gathering information. To exempt summarily the
work product of a party, his agent, or indemnitor on the ground of
privilege fails to take account of the real problem, which is this ques-
tion of fairness to the parties involved in the particular litigation.
In place of a standard categorical answer of "privilege" to the ques-
tion whether a party is entitled to a motion to produce, a more flexible,
and probably more just, result could be obtained by including this
question in the consideration of whether good cause has been shown,
and thereby leave it to the discretion of the court.
49. 8 WIGMORE § 2291; MCCORMICK. EVIDENCE § 91 (1954).
50. Note, 68 HARv. L. REV. 673. 680 (1955).
51. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
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A fourth '.requirement is that the matter sought must be "desig-
nated," which means that the seeking party must specify or particu-
larize the matter he wishes to inspect. The question arises, naturally,
as to what degree of particularity is necessary to comply with the
statute. The statute itself gives no indication. Both the Missouri and
the federal cases show the greatest amount of uncertainty regarding
the adoption of-a minimum standard which would meet the require-
ment. The federal cases suggest two standards. Judge Woolsey in
United States v. American Optical Co. set out the more conservative
view:
I hold that such designation in a motion under Rule 34 must be
sufficiently precise in respect of each document or item of evidence
sought to enable the defendant to go to his files and, without diffi-
culty, to pick the document or other item requested out and to
turn to the plaintiff saying "here it is.''52
The more liberal view was recognized in the Report of Amendments to
the Rules of Civil Procedure issued by the Advisory Committee on
Rules of Civil Procedure when it reported:
An objection has been made that the word "designated" in Rule
34 has been construed with undue strictness in some district court
cases so as to require great and impractical specificity in the de-
scription of documents, papers, books, etc., sought to be inspected.
The Committee, however, believes that no amendment is needed,
and that the proper meaning of "designated" as requiring speci-
ficity has already been delineated by the Supreme Court. See
Brown v. United States, 1928, 276 U. S. 134, 143. .... 3
The Brown case authorized the production of all letters and telegrams
related to a certain subject matter which passed between specified
points within a given time. In other words, under the rule of the
Brown case, it is sufficient to designate material by a category such
as "all letters relating to the contract for the sale of Blackacre."
Professor Moore states that the trend in the federal courts is to-
ward the more liberal position.5 4 Which of the two views will have the
stronger attraction for the Missouri courts is uncertain. The Missouri
Supreme Court has had no trouble in approving orders which conform
to the "here it is" test, although the catch phrase itself has not been
expressed in any of the opinions. The court has thus ordered produc-
tion of:. an office diary, books of account, check stubs, and canceled
checks ;'5 cash books, journals, and general ledgers ;1 a revoked will ;"T
52. 2 F.R.D. 534, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
53. 5 F.R.D. 433, 463 (1946).
54. 4. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2447 (1950).
55. State ex rel. Laughlin v. Sartorius, 234 Mo. App. 798, 119 S.W.2d 471
(1938).
56. State ex rel. Missouri Broadcasting Co. v. O'Malley, 344 Mo. 639, 127
S.W.2d 684 (1939).
57. State ex rel. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Sartorius, 351 Mo. 111, 171
S.W.2d 569 (1943).
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and books showing the withholding of income tax, earnings, and :re-
mittance of social security.,--
In State ex rel. Pieper v. Mueller" the court approved an order to
produce all records and memoranda made during the defendant physi-
cian's diagnosis and treatment of the .plaintiff. Although this may
appear at first glance to coincide with the liberal view of the federal
courts, the order actually falls within the scope of the strict rule.
This conclusion follows when it is considered that there was no dis-
cretion involved in selecting the medical records as there was in the
Brown case, where the order called for all records relating to a par-
ticular subject. In the Mueller case the defendant could have selected
the medical record and said, "Here it is," just as easily as he could
have picked out a check stub or an account book.
The same analysis applies to the order in State ex rel. Cummings v.
Witthausl calling for "all written agreements" between defendant
and his agent. Although this order would meet the strict test of the
federal courts, it was denied by the Missouri Supreme Court because
it was not shown that all agreements would be admissible evidence.
The moving party was left with the possibility of returning to the
lower court and asking for all agreements material to the issue, 61 but
the court did not indicate what the result would have been had he
done so.
A very unusual problem of designation arose in State ex rel. Bostel-
mann v. Aronson.2 A motion for the inspection of a safety deposit box
was predicated upon the assumption that the box contained relevant
evidence. The box itself could be identified precisely-it was box 2060
-but there was only slight circumstantial evidence to suggest that it
might contain admissible evidence, and it was not known what form
the evidence, if any, might take. The court denied the respondent
access to the box, but it is difficult either to condemn or to justify
the holding because the court failed to make evident the reasons for
this denial. If the motion in the Aronson case were considered to be a
request for the production of documents, the question before the court
would have been: Should the relator be compelled to produce all docu-
ments, papers, and tangible things relating to the issue which may be
found within box 2060? On this basis, it seems that production could
have been granted only if the court were willing to accept the liberar
interpretation of "designated" used in the federal courts.
On the other hand, if the motion were interpreted as a request for
58. State ex rel. Cummings v. Witthaus, 358 Mo. 1088, 219 S.W.2d 383 (1949).
59. 227 Mo. App. 1101, 59 S.W.2d 719 (1933).
60. 358 Mo. 1088, 219 S.W.2d 383 (1949).
61. To the same effect see State ex rel. Clemens v. Witthaus, 360 Mo. 274, 228
S.W.2d 4 (1950).
62. 361 Mo. 535, 235 S.W.2d 384 (1950).
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the inspection of property under the second part of Section 863 the
court would have had two issues to decide. First, does "designated
land or other property," as it is used in the latter part of Section 86,
include the "tangible things" mentioned in the first part of the section,
or is it limited, as it seems to be under the Federal Rules, 4 to such
things as buildings and ships? If a safety deposit box could be en-
tered as "other property," the second question would involve a de-
termination of whether it is necessary to further designate objects
maintained upon the premises, i.e., upon the land or other property.
If it were necessary to designate the objects within the safety deposit
box in order to inspect them, the issue would again be whether the
liberal interpretation of "designated" should be used.
Neither of the two remaining prerequisites, i.e., that the designated
-res be in the possession, custody, or control of the party from whom
discovery is sought, and that good cause for discovery be shown, has
been held to be of much significance by the courts of this state. The
only question concerning good cause that has arisen in the Missouri
courts is whether a moving party can show good cause when he al-
ready has the information sought or can obtain it by other means.
In State ex rel. Schlueter Mfg. Co. v. Beck6'5 the court denied to the
respondent the right to inspect the premises of his former employer
on the ground that he should have been familiar with the location,
and also prohibited enforcement of the order of the lower court grant-
ing production of samples, because they could have been obtained on
the open market. The federal courts have also denied discovery under
circumstances similar to those in the Beck case.66 Production has been
granted in the federal courts, however, where the only knowledge the
moving party had was the interpretation of a document offered by the
.adversary in an interrogatory, 7 or where production would obviate
delay, expense, and complicated legal questions.,
More should be said, however, regarding the precept that good
-cause be shown, because the requirement has been of such critical im-
portance in the Federal Rules. About the only statement that can be
made concerning a standard which would meet the requirement is
that it is difficult, if not impossible, to set out a definition which would
apply to every case. A review of the federal cases shows that it has
variously been said that the matter should aid in the preparation of a
63. See note 14 supra.
64. 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2473 (1950).
65. 337 Mo. 839, 85 S.W.2d 1026 (1935).
66. Dellameo v. Great Lakes S.S. Co., 9 F.R.D. 77 (N.D. Ohio 1949); Garrett
v. Faust, 8 F.R D. 556 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
67. Electric Furnace Co. v. Fire Assn, 13 F.R.S. 34.13, case 4 (N.D. Ohio
1950).
68. Hawaiian Airlines, Ltd. v. Trans-Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 12 F.R.S. 34.11,
,case 2 (D. Hawaii 1948).
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case;9 that the matter should be relevant to the issues;70 that the
matter should facilitate proof or progress at the trial ;71 and that con-
siderations of "practical convenience" are of prime importance.72 It
has also been said that good cause cannot be shown where production
would cause unreasonable hardship, 73 or where the seeking party
passed up previous opportunities to obtain the desired information.74
The flexibility with which this requirement has been applied is the
source of its signal importance in federal discovery practice. The de-
termination of good cause is within the discretion of the court 7 5 and
the starting point in the federal courts is a philosophy favoring notice
to the parties. In short, good cause has been used as the balancing
agent which the court can apply to see that justice is done in the con-
test between notice and privacy in the preparation of a case.
In Missouri there is no such balancing process in the consideration
of the facts of a particular case. The admissibility requirement and
the broad interpretation of the privilege requirement exempt so much
from discovery that there is little room to apply a flexible concept of
good cause. The inflexibility of the Missouri procedure results in an
automatic restriction of the scope of discovery.
CONCLUSION
It can be seen that there is a wide divergence between the Missouri
and federal law relating to pre-trial production and inspection of docu-
ments, papers, and tangible things, and the inspection of real and
other property. The reasons for the more extensive use of this type
of discovery procedure under federal law have been pointed out. Gen-
erally speaking, the reasons seem to be justified. No attempt has been
made to present the opinions of practicing attorneys regarding the
federal law, but most legal writers support its liberal interpretation.
It is submitted that the judicial interpretation of the Missouri Code
of Civil Procedure is outdated and overly restrictive. The standards
which the Missouri courts have adopted to guide this state's discovery
procedure are not well suited to the pre-trial stage. It should be re-
membered, however, that an outright adoption of the federal law
69. Schuyler v. United States Air Lines, Inc., 14 F.R S. 34.411, case 1 (M.D.
Pa. 1950); Garrett v. Faust, 8 F.R.D. 556 (E.D. Pa. 1949); United States v.
Nationpl City Bank, 40 F. Supp. 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
70. Electric Furnace Co. v. Fire Ass'n, 13 F.R.S. 34.13, case 4 (N.D. Ohio
1950); Michel v. Meier, 8 F.R.D. 464 (W.D. Pa. 1948).
71. Gordon v. Pennsylvania R R. 5 F.R.D. 510, 511 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (dictum).
72. United States v. 5 Cases, 9 F.R.D. 81 (D. Conn. 1949).
73. Sonken-Galamba Corp. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 30 F. Supp. 936 (W.D.
Mo. 1939).
74. Goldboss v. Reimann. 55 F. Supp. 811 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
75. Hawaiian Airlines, Ltd. v. Trans-Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 8 F.R-D. 499 (D.
Hawaii 19481; Lever Bros. Co. v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 38 F. Supp. 680
(D. Md. 1941).
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ovbuld not eliminate problems 'of construction.: In fact, it would prob-
ably create new problems in such areas, for example, as "good cause'
and "designation." Nevertheless, the cause of justice would justify
the additional burden.
KENT D. KEHR
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